II. NO "GENERIC" COUNTERPART-THEORETIC ANALYSES
The counterpart theorist must say that there are counterpart-theoretic analyses of modal properties. But any such analysis, if it is to have a hope of being successful, is committed to a substantive account of the nature of counterparts and possible worlds. To see why I say this, consider-for reductio-a purported analysis free of any such commitments. Consider this purely "generic" counterpart-theoretic analysis:
(1) O is possibly forty feet tall is analyzed as O has a counterpart that is forty feet tall. 6 In these debates, 'counterpart' is a technical term, its meaning stipulated by the counterpart theorist. And something must be stipulated; if nothing at all were stipulated, (1) would be meaningless rather than merely generic. Moreover, if (1) is to be generic, the stipulated meaning cannot favor one account of counterparts over another. The only meaning that seems to fit the bill-the only thing about counterparts upon which all accounts agree-is the following. An object O's counterpart is that which, by having a non-modal property, thereby gives the "modal version" of that property to O. 7 So (1), if truly generic, is really a condensed version of the following:
(2) O is possibly forty feet tall is analyzed as there is a forty-foot-tall something other than O whose being forty feet tall is what it is for O to be possibly forty feet tall.
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(In order to accommodate abstract counterpart theory, (2) itself should be read as a gloss of the more careful:
(2*) O is possibly forty feet tall is analyzed as there is something other than O that stands in some relation to the property of being forty feet tall and whose being thus related to that property is what it is for O to be possibly forty feet tall.
If O's counterpart is an abstract object it will have no height whatsoever. So it discharges its duty by standing in some relation other than exemplification to being forty feet tall. But for ease of exposition and only when it will cause no confusion, I shall continue to speak as if an object's alleged counterparts have the properties that it possibly has.) Even by the counterpart theorist's own lights, (2) is not a good analysis of O's being possibly forty feet tall. For O's being possibly forty feet tall is invoked in the analysans. Thus (2) is unacceptably circular. (Likewise with (2*).) Given only generic counterpart theory, (1) fares no better. For, as noted, (1)'s use of 'counterpart' makes it merely a condensed statement of (2).
(1) is done in by its use of 'counterpart'. But we cannot repair (1) by simply dropping that word. For consider: (3) O is possibly forty feet tall is analyzed as there is something other than O that is forty feet tall.
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Even if counterpart theory is correct, (3) is not. Not just any old forty-foot-tall object will do the trick. (The result of making the corresponding change to (2*) is even worse: (3*) O is possibly forty feet tall is analyzed as there is something other than O that stands in some relation to the property of being forty feet tall.)
The analysantes of (1) and (2) say too much; that of (3) says too little. To get a sense of how to avoid both extremes, contrast (1) through (3) with an analysis of the sort Lewis might give: (4) O is possibly forty feet tall is analyzed as there is something other than O, in a universe spatiotemporally isolated from ours, that is appropriately similar to O but that is forty feet tall. This analysis will prompt further questions, such as: What does "appropriately similar" amount to? But it is not circular, giving it a leg up on (1) and (2). Moreover, (4) says enough about the object invoked in the analysans to separate it from the obviously inadequate (3) . Thus (4), unlike (1) through (3) , is at least a legitimate contender.
The counterpart theorist need not agree with Lewis on the nature of counterparts; she need not endorse (4) . But if the counterpart theorist hopes to analyze modal properties successfully, she must avoid the errors of (1) through (3) and emulate the virtues of (4) . And to do that, she must tell us something about what alleged counterparts are like. There can be no generic counterpart-theoretic analyses of modal properties.
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Those who write in any detail about counterpart theory typically say something about the nature of counterparts. Often, they emphasize that our counterparts need not be concrete human beings located in physical worlds; they emphasize that counterpart theory as such does not imply Lewis's extravagant ontology. 8 But this had better not be the end of their story. For no counterpart-theoretic analyses of modal properties are endorsed by saying only that counterpart theory is true but David Lewis got it wrong. After all, the implicit circularity afflicting (1) also afflicts:
(1*) O is possibly forty feet tall is analyzed as O has an abstract counterpart that is forty feet tall.
I have considered various attempts at a generic analysis that begin with the idea that our counterparts have the properties that we possibly have. We have seen the problems with that approach. But before leaving attempted generic analyses behind, there is one other approach worth noting. An aspiring generic analyst might offer: shall argue that they directly undermine all such attempts except those that rely upon sui generis propositions (or states of affairs, etc.) ( §IV). I then show why no abstract counterpart theorist can rely on such propositions (or states of affairs, etc.) ( §VI).
Heller begins to explain his view by relating an account of worlds sketched by Quine.
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According to that account, a world is a set of ordered pairs. The first member of each ordered pair is an ordered quadruple representing a particular point in the "space-time manifold." The second is either a 1-representing that point as filled-or a 0-representing that point as empty.
In order to allow for properties not supervenient on distributions of being filled or being empty,
Heller modifies the Quinean account. Heller has the second member of each ordered pair be a set that represents a property; a different set represents each property that can be exemplified at a point in spacetime.
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So given Heller's theory, the following is a possible world: Those analyses are counterpart-theoretic. A world represents me as being forty feet tall in virtue of its having among its members a series of quadruples which thus represent me; that series is my "counterpart" in that world. (Moreover, its counterparts need not be my counterparts; thus we get the intransitivity of "transworld identity" that is a hallmark of counterpart theory.) Some may find this a strained notion of 'counterpart'. But, of course, any abstract counterpart theorist must invoke this or some equally "strained" notion. 14 And this is no problem. As already noted, in these debates 'counterpart' is a title of art; whatever plays the appropriate role in the analysis merits that title.
Heller's worlds are sets. We might wonder how a set like the one gestured at above manages to represent a possibility. Heller's answer is that sets represent only because we use them to do so. Moreover, which sets represent which possibilities depends on how the sets are interpreted. Indeed, Heller goes so far as to say "if no one had ever interpreted sets as possible worlds, then sets would not have represented alternative possibilities."
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Heller should say these things. Reconsider the view Quine originally sketched. There it is a matter of decision-not prior objective fact-that 1 represents a point as filled and 0 a point as empty. The number 1 could just as easily have represented being empty, 0 being filled.
Likewise, given Heller's account of worlds, it is a matter of interpretation whether {3, 48}
represents (for example) negative charge rather than some other property. And whether a series of quadruples (in a given world) is my counterpart representing me as tall, rather than yours representing you as short, is likewise a matter of interpretation.
Objection 1:
Heller claims that being possibly forty feet tall is analyzed in terms of set-theoretic representations. And he claims that which sets represent which possibilities depends on our interpretations. Together, these claims imply an unacceptable conclusion. They imply that the nature of my being possibly forty feet tall is, among other things, a function of how we interpret sets. After all, given one interpretation of sets, my being possibly forty feet tall will be analyzed as (my existing and) the existence of set S above. Given another interpretation, my being possibly forty feet tall will be analyzed as the existence of a distinct set T, differing from S by (for example) replacing every occurrence of 3 with a 7, and every occurrence of 7 with a 3. I think that the interpreting has not all been done; and so I think that-given Heller's view-we lack the modality we need. To begin to see why I say this, note that it was not true a thousand years ago that humans interpreted sets to represent the possibility of molecules' being composed of atoms. For humans then were not able even to entertain this possibility. But we are, surely, in a situation akin to that of our forbears. For there are, surely, possibilities we cannot entertain. And so, as a result, we have not interpreted sets to represent those possibilities.
Similarly, we have not interpreted sets to represent every possibility involving possible properties and individuals that do not and did not and will not actually exist (the "alien"
properties and individuals). So we have not-and will not and cannot-interpret sets to represent all the possibilities that we know there are. 18 So Heller's view-which implies that the extant possibilities cannot outstrip the interpreted sets-is wrong. This is my third objection to
Heller. 19 
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As an aside, I note that the above three objections threaten more than just abstract counterpart theory. They are objections to any view that endorses both of the following claims. 
Objection 4:
The above objections turn on the role Heller places on interpretation. Some might object that this picks on the worst part of his view. They might say a better way to take Heller-or perhaps a better version of a Heller-like counterpart theory-allows the worlds to represent "objectively" rather than as a result of our interpreting. Or, alternatively, they might say that we should consider a Heller-style approach that leaves representation out of the picture altogether. Even if we want to adjust Heller's theory so that it avoids the first three objections, we
should not abandon representation. The other option, then, is to insist that the sets in question do represent, but not in virtue of anything we do. I am not sure how sets (of ordered pairs of ordered quadruples and sets of numbers) are supposed to represent thus "objectively." It is odd to think that a set of ordered pairs represents me as being forty feet tall and the sun as being a hair smaller and so on in and of itself, intrinsically and objectively, not on the basis of any sort of interpretation. It is strange to say that sets could-in and of themselves-pull this off. The suggestion seems to be that these sets are a language, but not by convention.
The oddness of such a view aside, we might wonder how these sets represent. One reply is that they just do, end of story. Aficionados of ersatz possibilia will see that this reply is like what Lewis calls "magical ersatzism." 20 Presumably, if counterpart theory is built on a foundation of primitive or brute representation, it will be built on something like sui generis 16 propositions (or states of affairs, etc.) rather than on sets like S. So "magical" representation does not so much suggest a way of modifying Heller as it does an entirely different approach.
And I shall address that approach below ( §VI). (But, for the record, what I say about sui generis
propositions easily applies to the claim that Heller's sets magically represent.)
Perhaps the defender of a Heller-style theory will insist that sets like S represent objectively, but deny that they do so in the primitive way credited to sui generis propositions.
The only likely suggestion here is that sets like Heller's represent various possibilities in virtue of their "structure." And so, along these lines, Theodore Sider says: "Modal concepts lay down a structural requirement: our talk of possible worlds and the rest is about any structure that is suited to play the relevant roles." 21 So let us consider whether we can get objective representation from sets like S via their "structure."
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One objection to this idea begins by considering Paul Benacerraf's famous argument against identifying numbers with sets. A set's being (for example) the number three would be the result of some feature of that set. 23 But there is no relevant feature that one of the sets competing to be three has and all the others lack, no difference of the sort necessary to make one set (but none of its competitors) the number three. So either none of the competitors is three, or more than one of them is. But it is false that more than one of them is. (By the transitivity of identity, if any set is (identical with) the number three, no set not identical with it is also (identical with) the number three.) So no set is the number three. Parts of Benacerraf's paper are quite controversial; but its least controversial conclusion is that there is no set S such that it is the number three. 24 A similar sort of argument has been made against set-theoretic reductions of ordered The objection here is not that this view implies that more than one series of quadruples will qualify as my forty-foot-tall counterpart. This implication is unproblematic; counterpart theory happily insists that I have many counterparts in multiple worlds, many of whom make me possibly forty feet tall. Rather, the objection here is that this approach absurdly implies that no single analysis of a modal property is better than some incompatible analyses.
To see this point more clearly, return to the idea that a world is a set of ordered pairs, the first member of which is an ordered quadruple locating a point, the second of which represents that point as filled or as empty. One way of doing things has 1 representing a point as filled and 0 as empty; another approach has it the other way around. Obviously, these approaches are 18 inconsistent with each other: one approach uses 1 to represent being empty, the other uses it to represent being filled. So if the representations here are the true analyses of possibly being filled and possibly being empty, one or the other (or some third approach along these lines) will have to be objectively "privileged." But none is. There will always be equally good but incompatible set-theoretic ways to represent various possibilities, just as there are equally good but incompatible set-theoretic candidates for being the number three or for being the ordered pair <a,b>.
Some will object that Benacerraf's worry about identifying numbers with sets, and the worry Forrest and Armstrong have about identifying ordered pairs with unordered sets, are really no worries at all. Rather, some will say, it is simply indeterminate which of the competing sets is identical with the number three and which unordered set of sets is <a,b>. (There are a variety of ways this sort of reply could go, each invoking a different notion of indeterminacy. 27 )
I do not find this reply very plausible. I think it fails to block Benacerraf's objection, and fails to block Armstrong's and Forrest's objection. But my aim here is not to defend Benacerraf or Armstrong or Forrest. And I do not need to. For whatever one thinks of the indeterminacy reply with respect to, say, reducing ordered pairs to unordered sets, one should find it absolutely unacceptable as a way of saving the "objective" version of Heller's abstract counterpart theory.
To begin to see why I say this, consider the following. Faced with, for example, two intuitively similar reductions of ordered pairs to unordered sets, perhaps we could plausibly play the indeterminacy card. But playing that card would not be remotely plausible if faced with the idea that each ordered pair is identified with any and every set that meets or exceeds a certain threshold of structural complexity. And, of course, things get worse if the view in question implied that each ordered pair is also a cat and is a tree and is in fact each and every thing with a sufficiently complex "structure." The moral here would not be that it is indeterminate which of every complex entity is identical with <a,b>. The moral, obviously enough, would be that it was a mistake to try to reduce that ordered pair to whatever has a sufficiently complex structure. This is pretty much the place we find ourselves if we say that abstract worlds and their counterparts are sets that represent possibilities in virtue of their "structure," rather than in virtue of how they are interpreted. For although I have gone along with the general framework Heller suggests, there is no reason to think that abstract worlds must really be sets of ordered pairs rather than, say, sets of ordered triples, or quadruples, or...whatever. Indeed, there is no reasongiven only the vague notion that "structure" accounts for the relevant sort of representation-to exclude the idea that my being possibly forty feet tall just is the existence of a yawning cat.
Yawning cats do, after all, have "structure."
Whatever one makes of the Benacerraf-style objection in other contexts, it seems to me that it is decisive against the Heller-style theory according to which sets represent possibilities only in virtue of their "structure." At the very least, that objection cannot be plausibly blocked by invoking indeterminacy.
And the ubiquity of structure is not even the most fundamental problem here. For suppose, just for the sake of argument, we could somehow block the Benacerraf-style objection. The classic objection insists that Humphrey's possibly winning is one thing, an otherworldly twin of his pulling off an upset another. Nevertheless, the defender of "yawning cat" counterpart theory is mistaken if he responds: "I am no worse off than every other counterpart theorist; those who reject my view because it seems (to them) obviously false are just replaying the classic objection." Yawning cat counterpart theory is obviously wrong and we should come right out and say it.
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It is obviously wrong. But it is hard to say anything uncontroversial about why it is wrong. That is because to do so would be to note some desideratum of an analysis that the yawning cat account fails to satisfy. But, of course, any such desideratum is likely to be controversial. And, more to the point, any substantive "standard for a successful analysis" will be more controversial than the obvious falsity of the claim that my being possibly forty feet tall just is my being on the same planet as a yawning cat.
I think Heller is in yawning cat territory. Once we see that counterpart theory is supposed to give us analyses of modal properties then we should also see how implausible
Heller-style analyses are. Even if we set aside the first four objections, it would still not be plausible that my being possibly forty feet tall just is (my existing and) the existence of some set of the sort Heller invokes. Again, my being possibly forty feet tall is not the same thing as there being a particular set of ordered pairs of ordered quadruples of numbers and sets of numbers.
IV. OTHER ABSTRACT COUNTERPART THEORIES David Lewis presents, but of course does not endorse, a version of abstract counterpart theory. (In fact, Heller says his own view is an improved version of the theory Lewis presents.)
In sketching a view according to which abstract possible worlds are sets of sentences, Lewis says:
...it is not necessary that the worldmaking language should itself be anything like a natural language, or that there should be any way to speak or write its sentences, or that its vocabulary should be finite, or that its sentences should be finite in length. All we need is language in a generalised sense: a system of structures that can be parsed and Multiple "languages" will be equally well suited to the task of being the one out of which the sets are constructed that, in turn, issue in the analyses of modal properties. As a result, multiple but incompatible such analyses of each modal property will be equally good. And so we have a Benacerraf-style objection to abstract counterpart theory of the sort sketched by Lewis, if we should try to avoid the first three objections by downplaying the role of interpretation in that theory.
And, more importantly, if we deny interpretation a role here, it is hard to see how we have anything at all like a language out of which to construct the relevant sets. It is hard to see how we could have any good analyses, much less-as the Benacerraf objection requires-too many. Avoiding the first three objections by asserting that sets represent objectively is swallowing a frog to get the fly. (The fifth objection-the claim that my being possibly forty feet tall is not the same thing as there being a set or other abstract object-cannot be avoided at all.)
Perhaps someone will reply that the Lagadonian interpretation (or something like it) is privileged. This might be the reply, for example, of someone who thinks a singular proposition has its subject as a "constituent." 32 There are a variety of ways this might go. Such a view might claim, for example, that the proposition that Merricks is forty feet tall just is the ordered pair <Merricks, being forty feet tall>. Now I do not think this ordered pair represents anything at all.
It just sits there. And if it did, all by itself, manage to represent something, I do not see why it would represent my being forty feet tall rather than, for example, my not being forty feet tall.
Indeed, I do not even see why, when a member of such a pair, I am more fit to represent myself than, say, the number seventeen. So I do not think the Lagadonian approach helps.
But I am willing to concede, for the sake of argument, that if one were to defend objective representation by sets, the least implausible version would be broadly Lagadonian.
Even if this approach could be made to work, however, it would be of no help to abstract counterpart theory. For, according to this approach, an object represents itself in worlds according to which it exists; it is somehow a constituent of every world that represents it; it is, so to speak, its own counterpart in various worlds. Given this view, the "counterpart relation" is numerical identity. But the counterpart relation is not identity. So this view is not a version of counterpart theory at all. Indeed, because this view says that each object represents itself in various worlds, its closest cousin is the paradigm of anti-counterpart theory: modal realism with overlap. 33 (Or look at it this way. A reduction of modal properties to abstract worlds is counterparttheoretic if and only if (or perhaps to the extent that) it delivers the relevant theoretical payoff:
sortal-relative counterpart relations, intransitive "transworld identity," and some sense to the idea of contingent identity. 34 So-called Lagadonian counterpart theory delivers none of this because its "counterpart relation"-numerical identity-is not sortal-relative, is transitive, and is in no way Lewis's criticisms of "magical ersatzism" or for other reasons-will likewise refuse to accept the above reply. 36 And so some will think this response fails to save counterpart theory simply because what it says about representation is not credible.
But I do not want to leave it at that. This is because, as Peter van Inwagen has argued, we may be able to resist Lewis's attack on magical ersatzism. 37 Indeed, one might suspect that only Lewis's theory is safe from the above arguments.
One might suspect that those arguments trouble any non-Lewisian approach to de re modalityor at least any approach invoking abstract possible worlds. For example, just so long as modal properties are analyzed in terms of interpreted abstract structures (whether the analysis is counterpart-theoretic or otherwise) we face analogues of my first three objections to Heller's theory.
Moreover-setting aside sui generis propositions for the moment-the fourth objection raises problems for abstract worlds generally, counterpart-theoretic or otherwise, that try to avoid the first three objections by abandoning interpretation. For worlds seem unable to represent anything at all without interpretation lending a hand. Without our interpreting, it is hard to see how anything could be true according to a world. And if worlds did manage to represent on their own-we can play along by saying they do so in terms of their "structure"-they would run afoul of the Benacerraf-style objection. 
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The above reasoning is controversial. Some will deny the existence of representing abstracta. Others will believe in such abstracta, but deny that any are "maximal." And yet others will accept the existence of maximal representing abstracta, but will object to calling them 'possible worlds'. Happily, we can ignore these and similar controversies. For the point here is not that the view just outlined is true and felicitous. Rather, the point here is that that view-true or not-has nothing to do with analyzing modal properties.
Nor do other typical non-counterpart-theoretic accounts of abstract possible worlds. As For it renders representation by a world-and hence modal properties reduced to such representation-unintelligible.
The argument just given takes aim at any attempt to reduce de re modality to abstract representations. So the point of the above argument is that anyone who wishes to reduce de re modality to representation by abstract worlds cannot rely on magical ersatzism. And of course this implies that the abstract counterpart theorist cannot rely on magical ersatzism. As we have seen from the start of this paper, abstract counterpart theory has analytic ambitions. It aims to analyze (or reduce) modal properties to representations in worlds by counterparts. 41 There is a second problem with the combination of counterpart theory and magical ersatzism, a problem that afflicts the counterpart-theoretic species of reductionism in particular.
The magical ersatzist believes in sui generis propositions (or states of affairs, etc.). So suppose that we have sui generis propositions. And add that an object exemplifying properties P 1 through P n is "appropriately like me." The sort of counterpart theory we are here considering would then claim, roughly, that my being possibly forty feet tall is reduced to the de dicto possibility of the proposition that there is some object exemplifying properties P 1 through P n that is forty feet tall.
(And this proposition must somehow be part of a "possible world." For something "appropriately like me" is my counterpart only if it is the thing relevantly most like me in a given world.)
We are supposing that there are sui generis propositions. But if so, surely some are singular. If there is the proposition that there is some object exemplifying P 1 through P n that is forty feet tall, presumably there is also the proposition that Merricks is forty feet tall. Now ask yourself which of the following is the more natural or obvious or intuitive or plausible de dicto reduction of my being possibly forty feet tall:
(i) Possibly, Merricks is forty feet tall.
(ii) Possibly, some object exemplifying P 1 through P n [i.e., some object appropriately like Merricks] is forty feet tall.
Clearly, (i) is. But the counterpart theorist cannot reduce the claim that I am possibly forty feet tall to the de dicto possibility of the proposition that Merricks is forty feet tall. She cannot do this because, obviously enough, the resulting account of de re modality is not counterpart-theoretic.
For example, this account, like the view that each object represents itself in the worlds in which it exists (see §IV), fails to deliver the theoretical flexibility of counterpart theory.
(An additional small point in favor of the non-counterpart-theoretic approach to reducing the de re to the de dicto is that it is the more economical. As already noted, counterpart theory requires worlds. But the non-counterpart theorist needs only singular propositions, like that in (i) But perhaps some self-styled counterpart theorists offer no such account. Perhaps they employ "counterpart theory" not to reveal the metaphysics of modality, but rather as a heuristic to help us imagine, or to help them present, possibilities in a supposedly illuminating way. I suppose, for example, that most philosophers who use possible worlds as a mere heuristic have 35 in mind worlds of Lewis's sort; they will almost inevitably end up with merely heuristic counterpart theory. 43 Counterpart theory, if the true theory of modality, delivers novel modal results. These results-and the ways in which they solve certain puzzles-make counterpart theory attractive to some. 44 But the very features that make counterpart theory attractive as a theory of the nature of modality make it a dismal heuristic.
Here is one example. I can easily picture a "world in which I have two (personal)
counterparts." This picture suggests that there is some sense to be made of the claim that there is a possible world in which I am two people, and so some sense to be made of the claim that, possibly, I am two people. But this suggestion is totally misleading. For-if analytic counterpart theory is false-to say that there is a world in I am two people is to say that there is a way things could be such that, if things were that way, I myself would be two people. But if two people were identical with me, each would be identical with one person: me. Absurd. 45 A similar point could be made about heuristic counterpart theory's suggesting that "transworld identity" is intransitive. Or about its suggesting that "transworld identity" and (as a result) modal properties are sortal-relative. The moral in all these cases is the same. Heuristic counterpart theory suggests that we think of modality as if counterpart theory were true. But it is not true. And so we have no right to think of modality in that way.
Counterpart theory is not just a less prosaic, more picturesque way of saying what noncounterpart theorists had been saying all along. 46 And so thinking in terms of counterpart theory is useful if and only if it is an accurate way to think of modal properties; that is, if and only if there are counterpart-theoretic analyses of modal properties. But because analytic counterpart theoretic solutions to that paradox trade on the intransitivity of the counterpart relation (see, e.g., Lewis , On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 243-6 and Forbes, "Two Solutions to Chisholm's Paradox"). 35 Some might claim that the abstract counterpart theorist is no worse off with respect to the fifth objection than is the Platonist who thinks that being possibly forty feet tall is an abstract 38 Lewis does say that modal predicates are context relative. But, for Lewis, it is wholly objective whether an object stands in the various relations that constitute sortal-relative modal properties.
Because of the arguments in this paper against linguistic ersatzism, I think Lewis's theory is most defensible if representation drops out. That is, his view is most defensible if we deny that it is my counterpart's representing me as being forty feet tall that does the work; rather, its being forty feet tall and otherwise appropriately similar to me does it. We have here the "reduction without representation" that I criticized in §III as being unmotivated; but in Lewis's case, I think it is motivated. Given his ontology, his choice of counterparts does not seem arbitrary. 39 Cf. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 44; Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 19 n.18; and van Inwagen, "Two Concepts of Possible Worlds," p. 187. 40 The non-reductionist's view cannot be a version of counterpart theory. But Robert 
